Report of information trip to Chad and Cameroon - January 16th to 26th, 2007
Summary
On the contribution made by the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline to the development of both countries
Contents
2. Chad – Remarks on structure and development
3. Cameroon – Remarks on structure and development
4. Fundamental obstacles to development in both countries
5. The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline
6. The lack of a disaster-relief plan in Cameroona) The importance of the oil sector in Chad and Cameroon
b) The Chad-Cameroon pipeline project and the role of the World Bank
1. Aim of the trip
The aim of the trip, which took place on behalf of the Committee on Economic Cooperation and Development of the German Bundestag, was to gain a first-hand impression of the situation on the ground. We wanted to assess the extent to which the World Bank's commitment in financing the Chad-Cameroon pipeline had helped to ensure that oil extraction in Chad contributed to sustainable development in both countries, thus benefiting the people.
The World Bank had been keen to present the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, in operation since 2003, as a model project. It was intended to serve as a beacon, in contrast to the numerous raw-materials projects with negative impacts on developing countries. Yet the sustained criticism and reports by human-rights and environmental organisations of negative developments give rise to severe doubts about this perspective. Our intention in undertaking the trip was to gain additional information and report on this.
Overview of itinerary
| The trip therefore focused on the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline. Our itinerary included discussions in the Chadian capital, N'Djaména, and a visit to the oil-producing region in the south of Chad. There, we held discussions with NGOs and visited the Esso oil-production site. In Cameroon too, discussions were held on the subject of oil production with the government (economics and finance ministers), the oil transport company COTCO, and civil-society representatives. |
in the centre: Polycarpe Abah Abah, Minister for Economy and Finance of Cameroon |
In Kribi, where the pipeline ends, we were able to visit the decompression station. Next, we met with the fishing cooperative, a meeting which was particularly relevant following an oil leak at a loading terminal 12 km offshore one week earlier.
We also held discussions with representatives of German development-policy projects being run there, in order to gain an insight into the measures which Germany is supporting. After our arrival in the Chadan capital, N'Djaména, and some initial discussions there, we visited a project being run in cooperation with German development policy agencies, which focuses on rural development in the southern region of Mayo Kebbi around Pala.
In Cameroon, we met the forestry minister, amongst other people, along with German development-cooperation experts, who were able to tell us about the particular points of focus of sustainable resource management, health and decentralisation there.
We had the opportunity to meet experts from the GTZ (German Agency for Technical Cooperation", the KfW (Reconstruction Loan Corporation), the DED (German Development Service) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, along with representatives from Parliament and Government, and from the World Bank. We were also able to hold discussions with local NGOs, women's groups and the fishing community. This opportunity to talk to such a wide range of people meant that the views we heard were very varied, sometimes contradictory, which raised lots of questions, of which we were by no means able to deal with all.
Initial summing up
| The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline gives the impression in both countries of being something from another planet. The project is intended to serve the economic interests of the companies concerned and those of the governments, which are actually meant to work in the interests of their people. Unfortunately, hopes that the concrete situation will improve have not been realised, especially in Chad. |  |
We found that there was a major gap between the hopes and ambitions which were once linked with the building of the pipeline, and what has actually been achieved and realised. People there are very disappointed that their situation has not significantly improved, that numerous faults in the buildings, in schools and water containers, have been noticed and that complaints about environmental damage and pollution (such as generation of high levels of dust), are not taken seriously.
The building of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline has not been successful in bridging the economic, cultural and communicative gap between the four groups concerned (the firms, the World Bank, the governments and the people). We accept that major efforts were made to achieve this and that many people have worked hard to improve the situation. Yet significant deficits still seem to exist, particularly in terms of communication.
This is a poor starting point for the next few 25 years - the timescale for which the pipeline is expected by the authorities to operate. And the situation in Chad is particularly dramatic. Chad, under President Idriss Déby, is run in autocratic fashion and with no prospects of an administration likely to work for the common good. In 2004, the constitution was amended to allow Déby a third term in office. This has led to a loss of confidence that the President will be replaced by democratic means. Armed fighting is on the increase. In this context, oil revenues are especially valuable to the President, who is able to use them to consolidate his power. At the same time, they make Chad attractive to rebel groups, who are fighting against Déby with increasing determination. An attempt by the rebels in April 2006 to oust Déby by staging a coup failed only narrowly - and this was only thanks to French support for Déby. Luckily, our trip took place during a period where there was no conflict with the rebels - yet the situation appears to be deteriorating.
Cameroon is more dynamic in both economic and political terms. Indeed it is actually a rich country. Yet it is on a downward slope economically speaking and a great deal of energy is being invested in attempts to reverse this trend. Corruption has a firm hold. The large part of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline runs through Cameroon. This section runs through rainforest areas and through the living space of the indigenous population. Yet, since the country only serves as a transit zone for Chadian oil, revenues are modest, particularly in comparison with Cameroon's other oil revenues. Nevertheless, these resources do flow on a permanent basis. What is striking is that fact that, despite many promises of complete transparency concerning revenues from the pipeline, neither the fishing community, nor the mayor of Kribi has any exact figures. Undoubtedly, something is going wrong here.
2. Chad– Remarks on structure and development
Politics
The country has been independent since 1960. Following the violent overthrow of Hissène Habré (President from 1982 to 1990), Idriss Déby became President. The 1996 constitution enshrines the legal principles of separation of powers, a multiparty system, basic rights and decentralisation. Yet the newly formed administrative bodies are not yet able to function and the planned second parliamentary chamber (Assemblée Générale) does not so far exist. Likewise, the planned local elections have been repeatedly postponed.
The bar on presidents serving more than two terms was lifted in May 2004 by means of a constitutional amendment. This allowed Idriss Déby to begin a third term in office following the last elections in August 2006, which were widely criticised. Parliament has also authorised itself an (unconstitutional) one-and-a-half-year extension to its term, arguing that Chad is not in a financial position to hold parliamentary, presidential and local elections in 2006.
Economics/Development
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Around 80% of the population lives in absolute poverty, with a significant gap between rural and urban dwellers. The country's social-economic development has been significantly impeded by a number of factors: its isolated landlocked position, the division of the country into "le Tchad utile" (south) and "le Tchad inutile" (north) during French colonial rule, the civil war lasting several decades, frequent droughts, corruption and the inadequately developed infrastructure. The country's most important exports – alongside oil – are cotton (40% of overall exports), cattle, meat and rubber. The main buyers of Chad's exports are Portugal, Germany and the US. |
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Security situation in Chad, danger of spill-over from Darfur Conflict
In April 2006, rebels attempted to oust Idriss Déby. This resulted in 400 deaths. After the coup – which failed largely as a result of French intervention – Chad abandoned its role as peacebroker in the Darfur conflict. Déby accuses the Sudan of being behind the attempted coup. And Sudan is also said to be harbouring rebels, who allegedly operate into the East of Chad from there.
In eastern Chad, close to the Sudanese border, in addition to the attacks carried out by the rebels, heavily armed Arab mounted militias have been involved since the beginning of November 2006 in fighting with black African villagers. Several hundred people have been killed in the fighting in the provinces of Ouaddai, Salamat and Wadi Fira. In reaction to these attacks, the Chadian government announced a state of emergency in these three provinces and in the capital, N'Djaména, on 13 November. Whilst the rebels are aiming to oust Idriss Déby, those who are attacking black African civilians are evidently members of the feared Janjaweed militias, who have been attacking black African rebels and other inhabitants in Darfur since 2003 with support from Khartoum.
At the end of January, an assessment mission from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations visited Chad to gain an impression of the situation and evaluate the possible deployment of a UN peace mission to Chad and the Central African Republic. The report subsequently issued by the UN Secretary-General underlined the fact that the situation in the east of Chad in particular remained unpredictable. It stressed that destabilisation was leading to "widespread insecurity and human rights violations". (Report S/2007/97)
The continuing violence means that there are now 300,000 displaced people in Chad fleeing the militias (250,000 of them are Sudanese refugees from Darfur and 120,000 of them internally displaced Chadians). Around 50,000 Chadian refugees are currently in Darfur.
There are also refugees living in the south of Chad. More than 45,000 people who have fled over the border from the Central African Republic since June 2005 are living there in three different camps.
3. Cameroon– Remarks on structure and Development
Economy/Development and politics
Over the first 25 years of its independence, Cameroon was one of Africa's most prosperous countries. The falling prices on the oil, cocoa, coffee and cotton markets in the mid-1980s, combined with the overvalued currency and economic mismanagement, led to a decade-long recession. From 1986 to 1994, gross national income dropped by 60%. The budget deficit and state debt rose steeply.
But since Cameroon has oil, along with climatic conditions very favourable for agricultural production, it still has one of the strongest primary-goods economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet is has similar problems to many other developing countries, such as a bloated, top-heavy state apparatus.
Since 1982, Paul Biya has been President of this country, in which the government is not particularly ambitious and the opposition fails to function as such. Cameroon suffers from misgovernment, corruption, arbitrary political measures and a weak public administration.
The climate for investment is poor overall, since there is no legal certainty and no will to change this. Over the last few years, the economy has recovered once again (growth of around 4 % per annum), due not least to higher oil prices.
Cameroon has a poverty-reduction strategy and formally reached completion point in the HIPC debt relief initiative in 2006. Yet the IMF is critical of the government's macro-economic policies and has doubts about its will to tackle poverty. The disbursement of funds and the implementation of the measures agreed is also making only slow progress.
A comparison of figures
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Chad |
Cameroon |
Germany |
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Area |
1,284,000 km2 |
475,000 km2 |
357,023 km2 |
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Millions of inhabitants |
9.7 |
17.3 |
82.5 |
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Annual per-capita GNP (in US dollars) |
2090 (2006) 871 (2000) |
2174 (2006) 1703 (2000) |
28,303 (2006) 25,103 (2000) |
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Ranking in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (out of 163) |
156 |
138 |
16 |
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Literacy (over-fifteen-year-olds) |
25.7 % |
67.9 % |
99.0 % |
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Ranking in the 2006 Human Development Index (out of 177) |
171 |
144 |
21 |
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Child mortality amongst under-fives (per 1000) |
117 |
64 |
4 |
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Life expectancy at birth (in years) |
44 |
46 |
79 |
Sources: Transparency International, Human Development Report 2006 and 2002.
4. Fundamental obstacles to development in both countries
In both countries, corruption and the related lack of transparency can be seen as the greatest obstacles to development. Corruption is a basic evil which is widespread and found in all fields. It prevents oil revenues being effectively used in poverty reduction, for example.
Both countries are very well down the league table in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (see table above). Chad is amongst the 10 most corrupt countries in the world.
Another problem affecting both countries is the increasing availability of small arms and the rising propensity to armed violence. Gang crime is a major problem. In Cameroon, we were told that the police itself sells off its weapons illegally, in order to generate extra income.
Both countries suffer from inadequate public health and education systems. In Chad in particular, the illiteracy rate is shockingly high. Increasing economic liberalisation and the inflow of workers during the construction of the pipeline (and resulting increase in prostitution) have increased the number of those infected with HIV/AIDS.
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As in many African countries, women form the backbone of society in Chad and Cameroon. Yet this does not go hand in hand with a correspondingly strong political role or role in society. Indeed, the opposite is true: in Cameroon, we were informed about the widespread practice of breast ironing. In this horrific practice, the breast tissue of pubescent girls is ironed flat with the help of pestles or spatulas. This is obviously viewed as a "measure to protect the girls", since, if their breasts develop too early, it is believed that they will be seen as attractive prematurely, and thus at risk of falling pregnant. |
5. The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline
a) The importance of the oil sector in Chad and Cameroon
Cameroon:
Oil has been produced in Cameroon since 1977, mainly offshore in the Gulf of Guinea. The companies Total, Perenco, Pecten and Euroil are amongst those involved in oil production. Negotiations are currently ongoing over the exploitation of the oil and gas reserves which exist, mainly offshore. Renewed investment in explorations could increase the contribution of the oil sector to the economy.
Since the 1990s, oil production in Cameroon has been in decline, as oil reserves in the oilfields being exploited are gradually becoming exhausted. Whilst, in 1977, the country produced 182,000 barrels of oil per day, the current level of production is 90,000 barrels, according to information from the economics and finance ministry. Nevertheless, oil revenue still contributed 24% of the government's tax revenue, 50% of foreign currency reserves and around 6% of GDP.
Cameroon has its own refinery in Limbé. Because of the technology it uses, this refinery is not suitable to refine the heavy oil produced in Cameroon itself.
Since 2005, Cameroon has been a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). In December 2006, the Cameroonian government published its first report on revenues from the oil sector. According to information from the state-owned oil firm Société Nationale des Hydocarbures (SNH), Cameroon exported a total of 14.9 million barrels of oil in 2006, generating revenues of 95 million US dollars.
According to the EITI report on Cameroon's oil production and oil exports, Cameroon's oil exports were sold for a total of 1.5 billion dollars in 2005, of which 535.3 million went into state coffers and around 31 million were spent. However, the report contains no precise information on how the rest of the income was spent.
Chad:
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Oil explorations first began in 1969. Actual oil production did not begin until 2003, after the completion of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline. The oil produced from the oilfields around Doba – "Doba Blend" – is a particularly heavy form of crude oil, which, however, contains low levels of sulphur. Diesel (e.g. for electricity production) and other high-grade oil products have to be imported. |
Oilfields in Chad and the Sudan. The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline runs from Doba to Kribi (left) and the Sudanese Pipeline to Port Soudan (right). (Source: www.rfi.fr)
b) The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project and the role of the World Bank
Following a two-year construction phase, the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline began operating in 2003. The pipeline is expected to operate for at least 25 years and has a high technical standard (e.g. no side joint). It is monitored by means of externally mounted fibre-optic cabling for a drop in pressure and has so far been free of technical problems.
The pipeline consortium (now consisting of ExxonMobil, Petronas und Chevron Texaco) originally also included the firms Shell and Elf. Both firms announced they were withdrawing from the planning stage of the project in 1999, however, in order to avoid similar problems to those experienced in Nigeria.
In its estimates, the World Bank Group had assumed that Chad would receive around $2 billion of direct income (an average of $80 million per year) and that profits for Cameroon would total $500 million over the 25-year running period (an average of $20 million per year). In actual fact, by the end of 2006, Chad had already received $1.175 billion in direct and indirect revenues (cf. list in "Overview").
The World Bank supported the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline with the following goals:
- "to increase Chad Government expenditures on poverty alleviation activities; and
- to increase Cameroon fiscal revenues available for financing priority development expenditures, in the context of the Government's strategy for economic growth and poverty reduction." (World Bank Project Appraisal Document from April 2000)
The World Bank "saw its participation in funding for the Pipeline Project as a unique opportunity to help Chad made a paradigm shift in its economic development. Allowing a country with such limited resources and prospects for growth to access higher fiscal resources could make a significant difference for the Chadian people." (World Bank Overview of the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, p. 4) Since the risk of the oil revenues being misused was clear due to experiences in other countries, the World Bank made its financial commitment dependent on a "transparent framework for the collection and utilisation of oil revenues".
The Petroleum Revenue Management Program which was called for formed the basis of World Bank financing and was underpinned by the implementation of Law Nr. 001. Under this programme, 72% of direct revenues were to flow into priority areas (health, education, social services, etc.), 4.5% directly into community projects in the oil-producing region, and 10% into a Future Generations Fund, to be frozen until after the end of oil production. The independent "Collège de Contrôle et de Surveillance de la Gestion des Ressources Pétrolières" was established to monitor the disbursement of revenue; this organisation has to authorise spending on each individual project.
At the beginning of 2006, against the background of the threat to his power posed by increasing rebel activity, Idriss Déby amended Law Nr. 001. He dissolved the Future Generations Fund, thus terminating the agreement with the World Bank on the use of oil revenue. Shortly afterwards, the World Bank reacted by cancelling all new loans and grants to Chad and freezing the trust account for the oil revenue in London.
This meant that a new basis had to be negotiated for relations between the Chadian government and the World Bank. These negotiations resulted merely in a "Memorandum of Understanding", however, which has been in application since June 2006. The innovative Future Generations Fund has been abolished and the definition of priority sectors extended. This represents capitulation by the World Bank, since this Memorandum ultimately enables the Chadian government to spend the funds on securing its power.
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This is the end of the kilometer of paved road, which the World Bank gave to the village we just passed as communitary compensation. |
Evaluation: From the beginning, the World Bank justified its financing of the project on the grounds that it would be able to exert leverage on the Chadian government. Without the World Bank's involvement, a law on the use of the oil revenue would probably never have been enacted. And, without the involvement of the World Bank, it is unlikely that any Western oil company would have been prepared to take the risk of building the pipeline. Yet, now that the pipeline has been built, it is completely clear that the World Bank has gone about things in the wrong order. The pipeline is there, oil is flowing, money is flowing - and the World Bank no longer has any means of exerting leverage. The opposition's hopes of ushering in a democratic change of government were finally dashed in 2006. The oil revenue is benefiting the autocratic President and allowing him to maintain power, underpinned amongst other things by armed force. |
Cameroon: in which the majority of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline is to be found, receives transit fees, which vary not according to the price of oil, but to the volume of crude oil transported through the pipeline (41 US cents per barrel). If 4.53 million barrels are transported through the pipeline per month, revenues amount to around $1.8 million.
In view of the fact that the revenue from these transit fees is less than the revenue created for Chad (less than 2% of state income), the World Bank did not demand any mechanism for monitoring the spending of the revenues like the one demanded from Cameroon.
Overview of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline
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Length |
1070 km (of which the majority is in Cameroon) |
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Route |
From Komé in Chad to Kribi in Cameroon (mainly below ground) |
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Operating begin |
2003, following 2½-year construction phase |
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Operating phase |
Planned to operate for at least 25 years |
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Costs |
$4.8 bn ($3.7bn were estimated) |
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World Bank loans |
$39.5m to Chad, $53.4 m to Cameroon |
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IFC loans |
Total (A and B loans): $200m |
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Transit fees to Cameroon |
$0.41 per barrel
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Daily production |
250,000 barrels (oilfields in Bolobo, Komé, Miandoum, new: Moundouli) |
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Consortium ("Field-System") |
40% ExxonMobil (USA), 35% Petronas (Malaysia), 25% ChevronTexaco (USA) |
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Firms for "Export system" |
COTCO (Cameroon), TOTCO (Chad) |
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Revenues Chad (2003 to end of 2006) |
$683 m in licence fees, $3m in dividends, $29m in royalties, $458m in taxes, $2m other, totalling: $1.175bn (Source: World Bank) |
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EITI membership |
Cameroon: since 2005, first report on oil revenues, December 2006. Chad is not a member, though its government did announce its intention to implement EITI in a letter to the World Bank of June 2004. |
c) Failure as a development project: – "We shouldn't have called it Development Project."
Over the past few years, Chad's rate of economic growth has been the fastest in Africa (growth of around $1bn - $2bn per year, which is a huge amount considering it only has around 8 million inhabitants). Yet it is wholly evident that the pipeline and resulting revenues are not generating any real momentum for social and economic progress in the two countries.
Creation of jobs: We often heard during our trip that the pipeline was originally popular within the population. Many people believed the promises made by the governments and companies and expected an economic upswing and the creation of jobs. There were also hopes that the projects planned would provide support for the people. Particularly in Chad, the pipeline was perceived as a development project for the country as a whole and was promoted as such (c.f. picture below). When Esso began recruiting, thousands of people were hopeful of gaining employment and flocked to the base in Komé, for example. Almost overnight, a temporary village sprung up outside the gates here, in which hundreds of people waiting for work lived, some of them for months. Alcoholism, prostitution and AIDS took hold. But only the best qualified were given jobs.
"The road to hope. Oil is lighting up the economic future of Chad and Cameroon", article from the magazine The Lamp produced by the Exxonmobil Corporation, autumn 2002.
According to Esso, it was in 2002 that the largest numbers of people were recruited. Around 7800 Chadians found work, whilst around 2000 expatriates also came from other countries. In mid-2006, there were around 5000 jobs remaining for Chadians, and around 1000 expatriate jobs.
Yet people have good reason to be disappointed. The picture above shows that the consortium and the World Bank deliberately promoted the Pipeline project as a "development project". Indeed it was officially known as the "Chad Development Project". Our meeting with Ron Royal, head of Esso in Chad was revealing: "We shouldn't have called it 'development project'". In its December 2006 Implementation Completion Report, the World Bank also admits that "Messages should have been more realistic to avoid situations in which expectations were raised that were beyond the possible outcomes of the Project." (The World Bank's Completion Implementation Report, Overview, p. 41) Unfortunately, this realisation has come too late. The population – rightly – feels cheated.
Spending is not in line with the priorities of the population: it is true that the "Collège de Contrôle et de Surveillance" must authorise spending on every individual project to be implemented in the framework of the "priority sectors" in Chad. Yet the selection of these projects is not in line with the priorities set at regional level, for example; instead, decisions are taken by the central government. Tendering processes do not normally involve local firms, but take place in the capital, N'Djaména. The fact that regional priorities are ignored was demonstrated particularly graphically to us in the oil region Doba. Here, consultancies taking part in the project were drafting a regional development plan, in an expensive and laborious process, with considerable involvement from the population as part of the project. This plan identified the potential of individual sub-regions and those development projects of priority for the regions concerned. Yet it should be stressed that this regional development plan was not forwarded from the planning ministry to the government in order for it to be officially implemented; instead, it is gathering dust in a drawer at the planning ministry. And projects which do not meet the needs of the population continue to be run.
It is no wonder that the projects (primary schools, wells, etc.) which are being run in order to provide well-meaning support, are remaining marginal and failing to sustainably improve the living conditions of local people.
This was brought home to us even more clearly when we visited the German development project PRODALKA around the town of Pala in the Mayo-Kebbi region. Here we saw what is needed to truly lay the foundations for sustainable development. The contrast between the life of people in Chad and life at the Esso base in Komé is extreme. Mud huts, animal grazing and a lack of perspectives constitute a stark contrast to a daily existence with US living standards and a fully organised daily routine. This misbalance will not be able to be overcome without enormous efforts on both sides.
The interests at play are clear. The heavy oil which is transported from Chad, right the way across Cameroon, and distributed across the world in tankers is essentially intended to quench the Western world's thirst for resources and raise the profits of the companies concerned. The revenues generated only reach the governments in Chad and, to a smaller extent, Cameroon, in the second instance. And only once the money has been divided up at the top does the population have any chance at its needs being met. Yet these comments are not intended to mitigate our criticism of the Chadian government's failure to exercise government responsibility vis-à-vis its own people. In the case of Chad, it is quite clear that the autocratic head of state, Idriss Déby, is unashamedly helping himself from the oil-revenue coffers, in order to underpin his own power. And, in doing so, he is ignoring the needs of his people. The World Bank did try and prevent this in early 2006, yet it subsequently had to admit that it no longer had any kind of leverage on the Chadian government.
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Increasing population pressure in the South: The pressure on the fragile ecosystem around the oil-producing regions has significantly increased, meaning that over-grazing and overuse of soil in the south, in the Mayo Kebbi region for example, can no longer be denied. Since the amount of oil extracted in the first three oilfields dropped surprisingly early, new oilfields have to be opened up in Chad. There is a considerable risk that areas which are so far untouched will be affected. Prospecting is taking place in an area on the border to Cameroon, for example, which is to be declared a trans-national nature conservation park due to its environmental richness. Once prospecting has begun in earnest, settlement is inevitable, along with the over-exploitation of natural resources. |
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During our trip through Chad and Cameroon, we were able to become familiar with different aspects of the Pipeline project. There are a great many contradictions and unanswered questions regarding the degree of improvement in the population's living conditions, the different components of the Pipeline – and, in particular, the question of revenues. In addition, clear difficulties in communication exist between the companies and the people and the governments and the people, both in Chad and in Cameroon. The high level of transparency and the willingness to share information with us demonstrated by the oil company Esso, for which we were grateful, does not, unfortunately, appear to be the norm.
6. The lack of a disaster-relief plan in Cameroon
On 16 January 2007, an oil spill occurred at the marine terminal offshore from Kribi in Cameroon, in which around 100 to 150 barrels of oil were leaked. The oil was able to flow into the sea, due to a hole in the terminal, a converted tanker. Unfortunately, the measures undertaken by the responsible company, COTCO, to keep the public in Kribi informed were unsatisfactory, thus confirming the worst prejudices. In addition, this suggests that, despite all declarations to the contrary, no sophisticated disaster-relief plan exists. This is something which requires urgent attention.
Ntaryike Divine from Douala writes on this subject in his article "COTCO downplays Kribi pipeline oil spill", published in a Cameroon newspaper in January 2007:
"The same worries are now emerging amongst locals, who mostly look back with regret at a project whose fallouts, from jobs through local investment to social amenities remain farfetched. In fact, all Kribi can show as fruits of the construction of the pipeline today are a booming sex market, hopping HIV/Aids prevalence, crushing poverty and fears of an oil spill of greater magnitude."
The construction of the Pipeline has not solved the real problems in Chad, indeed it has even exacerbated them; this can be seen, for instance, in the overuse of soil due to increasing population pressure and the spread of AIDS. No improvement in the situation of the people could be seen in either country. Instead, there were concerns about a creeping deterioration in their living standards. The civilian population is in some cases very well organised, yet has only very limited opportunities to demand participatory rights and grass roots democracy.